I. SERBIA
Background. The current political system in Serbia was instituted
after the October 5, 2000, coup that deposed President Slobo
dan Milošević. It was carried out using methods of what came to be
known as “colored revolution.” The methodology developed by West-
ern hybrid warfare specialists became a pattern that was subsequent-
ly repeated in a number of other countries. The local Serbian group
that spearheaded the operation, known as “Otpor,” soon was profes-
sionally reconfigured and renamed “Canvas” (Center for non-violent
alternatives). It went on to perform major hybrid warfare subversion
tasks outsourced to it by its Western intelligence trainers and pay-
masters: in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Moldova (2009), and
again Ukraine (2014), to mention a few.
After the imposition in 2000 of a pro-Western system in Serbia,
regimes and ruling coalitions appeared to vary but the basic thrust of
government policy invariably remained the same, following the dir-
ectives of Euro-Atlanticist power centers, often conveyed quite braz-
enly by their resident ambassadors in Belgrade. A major political shift
favoring Western control of Serbia and consolidating the system that
was set up to obediently serve Euro-Atlanticist interests was the split
provoked in in 2008 in the ranks of the Serbian Radical Party, at the
time the largest single political group and main anti-globalist political
force in Serbia. Carefully disguising initially the length to which they
were prepared to go in championing policies which up until shortly
before they were denouncing bitterly, and deftly modulating their rhet-
oric under the guidance of Western PR consultants, Nikolić and Vučić
formed their own political organization, the Serbian Progressive Party,
taking with them the majority of the former Radicals. As a result of
that intrigue, and two successive electoral victories based on promises
they had no intention of keeping once they gained office, Nikolić is
now Serbia’ s President and Vučić is the Prime Minister.

Key issues.
Kosovo: The resource-rich south Serbian province of Kosovo and Me-
tohija (Kosovo, for short) holds special significance in the eyes of the
Serbian people as the historical cradle of their civilization and spirit-
uality, the central and quintessentially Serbian land which defines the
national identity of the Serbs. It plays for the Serbs essentially the same
role that Jerusalem does for the Jews. As a result of the NATO attack
on Yugoslavia in 1999, precipitated by the alleged mistreatment of the
Albanian minority, which by that time had gained the upper hand
demographically in Kosovo, the province was occupied by a NATO-
led international force. In violation of UN Resolution 1244 guaran-
teeing Kosovo’s status as an integral part of Serbia, in 2008 Albanian
authorities in the province unilaterally declared independence with
the tacit encouragement and support of the United States and major
Western governments (although five members of the EU still refuse to
recognize that act officially). Ever since, the thrust of Western policy
has been to pressure Serbia to “normalize” its relations with Kosovo
(a euphemism for legally accepting the secession) in return for being
allowed to open negotiations on Serbia’s accession to the European
Union.
The carrot of EU membership, with its imagined economic bene-
fits, has been a major tool in persuading Serbian public opinion to
tolerate successive governments’ gradual surrender of de iure sover-
eignty over Kosovo. As things stand presently, Serbia has agreed to the
establishment of what by all accounts is a state, as opposed to merely
provincial, border with Kosovo, including customs duties and other
characteristics of frontiers separating the territories of sovereign coun-
tries. Serbian administrative, judicial, and educational institutions
in Kosovo that remained after NATO occupation in 1999 have been
relentlessly and effectively dismantled with the consent of successive
Serbian governments and the remaining Serbs (after about 250,000
had fled the NATO onslaught in 1999) now live in small, scattered, and
insecure enclaves frequently subjected to Albanian harassment.
The European Union. As a result of somewhat improved informa-
tion from abroad, combined with the palpable fallout of the global eco-
nomic crisis whose effects are by now acutely felt in Serbia, and the rise
of a visible alternative in the form of a trading block led by the Russian
Federation, enthusiasm in Serbia for joining the European Union has
been dampened. However, its attraction still holds sway over a sizeable,
although decreasing, portion of the Serbian population. The goal of
joining this vaguely known utopia is treated by Serbia’s political elite
as an unquestionable political axiom which requires neither the dis-
semination of accurate information nor a thorough public debate, let
alone an informed popular vote.
NATO. Neutrality is officially enshrined in Serbian law, which
would seem to preclude joining any military blocks. Yet the fact that the
preamble to the Serbian constitution states that Kosovo is an inalien-
able part of Serbia has not prevented successive regimes from steadily
whittling down their country’s effective and de iure presence in the
disputed province. Legal obstacles have not been known to discourage
Serbia’s frivolous political elite. The neutrality law notwithstanding,
Serbia is a member of the NATO “Partnership for peace” program, it re-
cently signed the ominous Status of Forces agreement granting NATO
troops unlimited access to the country’s facilities and NATO soldiers
immunity for any acts of personal wrongdoing, and NATO personnel
currently sit ensconced in the Serbian Defense Ministry, presumably
engaged in “cooperation” and giving “advice” to the military of the
country they ruthlessly and illegally bombed 16 years ago.
As might be expected, NATO membership is opposed by a strato-
spherically elevated percentage of the population. However, numerous
well-financed pro-NATO “NGOs” and lobbying groups are working
overtime in Serbia to paint a positive picture of the alliance and the
supposed benefits that await Serbia upon joining it.
The stealth, no advance notice, no public debate procedure by which
the Status of Forces agreement was recently adopted by the Serbian
parliament is probably the model which will be followed to give a fig
leaf of legality to Serbia’s eventual membership in NATO, notwith-
standing the fact that it is an idea abhorred by as much as 90% of the
population.
The Migrant crisis and its implications. The influx of hundreds of
thousands of migrants from the Middle East and Africa, fleeing from
Western unleashed wars and mayhem and understandably seeking
opportunities for a safer if not more prosperous life, has placed an
enormous strain on Serbia, which geographically is an unavoidable
corridor for their passage to what they believe are wealthy Western
European societies. To make Serbia’s position even more precarious, in
2007, when the human tsunami sweeping the continent could not even
be imagined (at least not by Serbia’s short-sighted rulers) the Serbian
government carelessly signed a Readmission Agreement with the EU.
In consequence, a legal basis was established eight years ago for the
repatriation today of masses of migrants not wanted by EU countries
to the last non-EU country from which they crossed over into Union
territory, and that country just happens to be – Serbia.
In addition to an accumulation of severe problems of its own, Serbia
will very likely be cajoled into playing host to a huge number of cultur-
ally and linguistically unassimilable migrants who keep arriving in a
steady stream from the south and will be reinforced by additional tens
of thousands from the north that will be expelled by Germany, France,
and Holland and dumped into impoverished and devastated Serbia.
The strain that will be placed on Serbian society and economy by
the inundation of such huge numbers of foreigners is frightful to con-
template. Sporadic conflicts between groups of migrants from diverse
countries as well as assaults against locals are already taking place in
Serbia, although most media strive to circumvent and outright sup-
press this politically “incorrect” topic. The initially widespread sympa-
thy for these victims of Western-inspired upheavals is rapidly eroding
as the sheer magnitude and cost of the hosting operation, foisted upon
a poor and helpless country incapable of meeting the basic needs of its
own masses of underprivileged citizens, are beginning to sink in. The
potential of the migrant crisis to engender ugly internal conflict and
debilitating destabilization in Serbia is rising steadily.
Relations with Russia. Unalterably warm sentiment toward Russia
is one of the few bright spots on Serbia’s otherwise dismal psychologic-
al landscape. There is plenty of evidence on the Russian side that these
feelings are amply reciprocated. Leading Russian public figures and
intellectuals, as well as ordinary citizens, have voiced deep affection for
Serbia and clearly consider these emotions fully requited by the “little