1. Introduction
At 6 o’clock on the afternoon of July 23, 1914 Austro-Hungarian envoy,
Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, personally delivered his government’s ulti-
matum note into the hands of the Serbian minister, Lazo Paču, in Bel-
grade and five days later Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Italy
was bound by a tripartite alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany
on the basis of the fifth version of the Tripartite Pact signed December
5, 1912 in Vienna and valid to 1920. The seventh, and most important,
Article of the Pact outlined the retention of the status quo in Eastern
Europe, including the Balkans and the Turkish-held coasts and islands
in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas. But if the actions of some third power
made it impossible to sustain the status quo, the accord allowed for the
temporary, or permanent, occupation of these regions only after the
prior agreement of the Pact co-signatories concerning mutual com-
pensation. At the same time, Italy did not conceal its opposition with
respect to the expansionist policies of Austria-Hungary from the time
of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the
intensive four-day debates held December 1-4, 1908 in the Italian Par-
liament and recorded on almost 200 pages. 1

2. Italy and the First World War, 1914
On July 24, 1914, the day after the ultimatum was delivered to Serbia,
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Antonino Paterno-Castello, Mar-
quis of San Giuliano, sent a protest note to the German ambassador in
Rome which said that Italy will consider a war between Austria-Hun-
gary and Serbia as a premeditated act of aggression by Vienna. 2 At
the same time, he also sent a letter to the King in which he expressed,
among other things, his conviction that „it would be extremely diffi-
cult and certainly very dangerous to involve Italy in an eventual war
provoked by Austria and which would be conducted exclusively in the
interest of Austria.“ 3 On the same day he sent another letter to General
Secretary for Foreign Affairs De Martin in which he said that „without
the prior agreement of Italy, Austria’s occupation of Serbia, even if tem-
porary, would represent a breach of Article 7 of the Tripartite Pact and
which Italy would have to challenge.“ 4
The situation developed rapidly during the next seven days and to
the end of July 1914: general mobilization was declared in Russia and
Austria-Hungary and war preparations also commenced in Germany
which declared war on Russia August 1, on France August 3 and the
English-German war began August 4. At its meeting of August 2, the
government of Italy declared its neutrality based on Article 4 of the Pact
and announced its decision the following day.
Austria-Hungary was not at all surprised by Italy’s position. In that
regard, it is sufficient to cite the letter of Gottleib von Jagow, former
Austrian ambassador in Rome and newly appointed secretary of state
for external affairs, sent July 15, 1914 to the German ambassador in
Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirsky, in which it states: „The Italian media is
as much on the side of the Serbs as it is generally austrophobic. As far as
I am concerned, I have no doubt that, in the event of an Austro-Serbian
war, it will immediately switch to Serbia’s favour.“ 5 On August 3 the Aus-
trian ambassador in Rome, Kajetan von Merey, advised his minister,
Leopold Berchtold: „During yesterday’s discussions, the Italian min-
ister for foreign affairs again presented the reasons which are coercing
Italy to [adopt a position of] neutrality. He especially underlined the
great sacrifices and dangers to which Italy would be exposed, beyond
any proportional benefit, in [the event of] war.“ 6
This decision of Italy’s Austria interpreted as an announcement of a
declaration of war and gave precise instructions to General Franz Rohr
von Denta, commander of the forces on the Southeastern Front, which
said: „From the many indicators it is understood that Italy is preparing
to realize its aspirations in our southern provinces, especially since our
forces are occupied on other battlefields. (…) For now, it is impossible
to specify when and how Italy’s first attack will occur; in any event,
we must be prepared for such an attack and respond forcefully and
resolutely.“ 7
In Italy the decision concerning neutrality was at first welcomed
unanimously. However, behind the political and diplomatic backdrop
a different scenario was being prepared. Andrea Carlotti di Ripabella,
Italian ambassador in Moscow, advised his minister for foreign affairs
that Sergei Dimitrijević Sazonov, Russian minister for foreign affairs,
had confided to him that Russia, France and England had reached a
framework agreement in which Italy would be guaranteed the territory
of Trentino and supremacy in the Adriatic. 8 That would give space to
the advocates of intervention whose primary representative was Sidney
Sonnino, the new Italian minister for foreign affairs, who was sup-
ported by the new prime minister of Italy, Antonio Salandra.
Meanwhile, the political situation in Europe was evolving rapidly.
On September 23 Italy and Romania signed an agreement of concurrent
renunciation of their neutrality which would be succeeded by a new
agreement concerning reciprocal military assistance in the event of
Austrian aggression against one of the co-signatories. At the end of Oc-
tober Turkey aligned itself with Germany against the Entente Powers
who were joined by Portugal some time later.

3. Treaty of London – Italy enters the War
As Prime Minister Salandra had specified in Parliament, Italy was pre-
paring for an intervention, although on December 3 it had declared
its “neutrality, but with powerful armaments and readiness for every
eventuality.” At the end of the year Minister for Foreign Affairs Sidney
Sonnino began negotiations with both opposing blocks and on April
26, 1915 concluded secret meetings with the Entente Powers with the
signing of the Treaty of London. The agreement called for: Italy’s com-
mitment to enter the war within a month, for Britain’s pledge to give
Italy loans of at least 50 million pounds for armaments, and Italy was
promised Brennero, Gorica, Gradiška on the Soča, Istria to Kvarner,
central Dalmatia, Valona, the Dodecanese islands [in Greece] and the
territory of Antalya in Turkey.
On May 3 Italy withdrew from the Tripartite Pact and declared gen-
eral mobilization. In the meantime, the following was happening in the
field: German Field Marshal August von Mackensen was winning on
the Russian Carpathian Front; after it had liberated Belgrade, Serbia
halted leaving the enemy time to withdraw and re-organize, but that is
why Serbia’s troops advanced toward Drač [Albania] while the Monte-
negrin troops advanced directly to occupy Skadar; the French-British
forces were in an extremely difficult position compared to the Turk-
ish forces at the Gallipoli peninsula; and Italy declared war on Aus-
tria-Hungary on May 23. In such a situation, that act stunned Italy’s am-
bassadors in Vienna and Berlin whose correspondence reads as follows:
„In my long diplomatic career I have not had the opportunity to witness
our foreign policy being handled in such a sordid and disloyal manner
as Sonnino and the government are doing. And the idea to withdraw
from the Tripartite Pact with respect to Austria-Hungary, but not also
with respect to Germany, I consider pure childish ’finesse’ and stupidity
which can emanate [only] from the minds of small brains such as these
currently in our authority.“ 9 Giuseppe Avarna, Italian ambassador in
Vienna, wrote these words to his colleague and friend Riccardo Bollati,
Italian ambassador in Berlin.
The declaration of war did not surprise Austria-Hungary which was
anticipating this outcome. On May 20, 1915, three days before the war
declaration, the Austrian High Command had already given operating
instructions to Archduke Eugene, commander of the forces in the Bal-
kans and later in the entire Southwestern Front. The instructions read:
_________________________

1) Atti Parlamentari, Legislatura XXII, discussioni. Roma, Camera dei
Deputati, libro 32, anno 1908.
2) Gian Paolo Ferraioli, Politica e diplomazia in Italia tra XIX e XX secolo
(Soveria Mannelli:Rubettino, 2007).
3) San Giuliano al Re, 24.7.1914, (MAE, DDI, Series IV 1908-1914, volume XII,
doc. 470).
4) San Giuliano a De Martino, 24.7.1914, (MAE, DDI, Series IV 1908-1914,
volume XII, doc. 449).
5) Luigi Albertini, Le origini della guerra del 1914 (Milano: Fratelli Bocca
Editore, 1942).
6) Ibid.
7) Ufficio Storico SME, L’esercito italiano nella Grande Guerra 1915-1916,Roma,
1983, volume II.
8) Carlotti a San Giuliano, 1029/50 of 8.8.1914, (MAE, DDI, Series V, volume I,
doc. 133).
9) Lettera di Avarna a Bollati, of 13.5.1915, (MAE, DDI, Series V 1914-1918,
volume III, doc. 682).