German historical revisionism in the Balkans at the turn of the 21st century

This is the area of study for the social Theory of Definitionism.

III
The linguistic and philosophical approach to historical revisionism in
the Balkans by German universities and academic institutions at the
end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century.
(Theory of Definitionism)

“Interesting ideas. I’ve never thought about them.
Will try to find some time to do so.”
(Noam Čomsky, about Definitionism-Theory, 11.03.2010.)

The theoretical ligature between all the spiritual activities of man is
language, and not only as a common good and not only as a method
of communication. Language is also the substance of thought and all
speculative intelligence, which essentially determines mankind’s bio-
logical species and is the precondition for all sciences, and conditio
sine que non for the existence of man as he understands, practices, per-
ceives, and creates it.
An important precondition for this way of thinking was, of course,
the paradigm shift in the philosophy of language in the 20th century,
which claims, among other things, that we are not the ones who de-
termine, deconstruct, and explain language, but rather language – at
least to the same degree – determines, deconstructs, and explains us.
At the same time, in philosophy – as opposed to the historical sciences
– making moral and ethical value judgments about the condition, rela-
tion, and process of the subject matter is not only permissible but also
inevitable. Let us consider a few important determinants of the theory
of definitionism and its implications regarding research into the phe-
nomenon of genocide.
One such approach is not by its structure limited to solely the phe-
nomenon of genocide, but is also applicable to all social (i.e. humanist)
sciences. However, when it comes to research on the phenomenon of
genocide, there is one unpredictable linguistic causal dimension: The
first – introductory, the second – which follows the concrete physical
realization of this crime, as well as the third – the final act of geno-
cide, are always linguistic in nature. This means that just like economic
and financial preconditions enable the establishment and usage of the
necessary logistics, a repressive state apparatus physically plans and
realizes the plan, and words (= acts) define, direct, and thus condition
the realization of available political will in relation to the objective.
Hence, we are talking about a pre-emptive dehumanization of the
target group of pre-selected victims (first act), which is then reinforced
throughout the act of committing genocide (second and permanent
act), while the final act of genocide includes the subsequent apologetics
for it, whether it is the minimization of the crime committed or rather
– in extreme cases – its complete denial (third act). These characteris-
tics are clearly present in all acts of genocide in recorded history.
There is no genocide that was not first preceded by and then ac-
companied by a psychological campaign and the redefinition of the
target group into a “subhuman species”, whose physical elimination
is therefore not murder but rather a “permissible” and “legitimate” act.
Only with the use of such a campaign does it become possible to mobil-
ize the always large number of “ordinary” co-conspirators and co-actors
(Hanna Arendt and the “Banality of Evil”, 1968). In the same vein, there
is no genocide that was not either minimized or denied after the fact.
The mechanism of the internalization of linguistic suggestions, dis-
covered by Norbert Elias, is always the interaction between the ideo-
logues of genocide (who in the pre-emptive phase, but also in the phase
of realization and the phase following the realization of the crime, usurp
control over definitions, e.g. “white is black”, “freedom is slavery”, “war
is peace”, “Jews, Serbs, Roma are inferior beings”, etc.) and the “ordinary”
co-conspirators and co-actors. Alas, this is an asymmetrical interaction
between the two groups, but neither of these groups can use this fact as
an alibi for committing the crime (an asymmetrical interaction always
presupposes asymmetrical responsibility, but never the forfeiting or
minimizing of said responsibility altogether).
This claim can immediately be tested on the historical example of
Serbocide 1941-1945, which was committed by members of the Cro-
atian nation and their Bosnian Muslim helpers. The first genocidal
acts in relation to this concrete crime includes the words (= acts) of the
ideologue of Greater Croatia and one of the spiritual fathers of Serbo-
cide 1941-1945, Ante Starčević:
“The Serbs are thus war criminals and, at the same time, the stu-
pidest residents of Croatia (...) villains, bloodthirsty traitors and scum
(...) they are cattle (...) that dog breed stands much lower than ordin-
ary animals (...) already in this world the axe awaits these villains...”.
As a reminder – the above cited Pothof claims that Ante Starčević
was not a Greater Croatia ideologue and racist who drastically de-
humanized the Serbs and called for their extermination, but rather
merely the “creator of a nationalist ideology who only wanted Cro-
atia’s independence from Austria-Hungary and was even willing to
ally himself with the Serbs (...) analysis of his works shows that he
was not referring to a Croatianization of the Southern Slavs, but a state
union between them....” Similarly, the above cited Alexander Korb re-
defines Ante Starčević into a “national-democratic politician inspired
by the French Revolution whose political Party of Rights demanded
the assimilation of the Orthodox Christian population in Croatia.”
However, the genocidal character of the words (= acts) of Ante
Starčević comes out of the undisputable fact that his redefinitions
served to dehumanize a target group, and that this was ultimately fol-
lowed by the crime of genocide against the Serbs 1941-1945.
Because, once more – only through the mass dehumanization of a
pre-selected target group can large numbers of “ordinary” people be
motivated to commit the mass murder of women, children, men, the
elderly, i.e. helpless victims.
The words (= acts) of previously mentioned Ivo Omrčanin are also
part of the final acts of Serbocide; hardly ten years after the end of
WWII and the Serbocide he claims that it was in fact the Serbs who
committed genocide against the Croats:
“... And then began, as we have proven already, a Serbian genocide
against Croatians. The worst of it happened between 1941-1945, when
Croatians took their fate into their own hands so that they could live in
peace in their Independent State of Croatia. However, the neighboring
Serbs, who throughout history were helped by Croats, declared a de-
structive war against the Croats, which was waged in the most brutal
way (...) and for Croatians it was completely new, it surprised them
and found them completely unprepared...”.
The genocidal character of these words (= acts) and Ivo Omrčanin’s
attempt to redefine reality does not only express itself in his deeply im-
moral and factually complicit apologetics for the Serbocide 1941-1945.
The essential danger of these kinds of verbal acts (redefining history)
lies above all else in the perpetuation of a latent genocidal potential in
a given society (= the danger of repeating genocide). At the same time,
the apologetics for a genocide that was already committed allows the
“ordinary” people who helped carry it out to maintain their sense of
“normalcy” in the psycho-social and psycho-moral sense.
This way of thinking in the context of researching the theoretical
foundations of the phenomenon of genocide conditioned my attempt
to explore the possibility for a linguistic and philosophical solution
to this problem. The end result was the formulation of the following
hypothesis (as a basic claim of the linguistically and philosophical-
ly conditioned Theory of Definitionism) which was presented to the
public in 2006 with an invitation for further and more comprehensive
research on the subject:
The usurpation of control over definitions with the intent of at-
taining a monopoly over them by centers of political power cloaked in
national or para-national structures is the most effective instrument
of said centers of political power and is at the same time the moving
force behind progression and regression in the local and global de-
velopment of human society. The growth of political power is experi-
ential and directly proportional to the decline in the commitment to
the imperative of ethics in human society. With that, the usurpation of
control over definitions is the co-determining causal and accompany-
ing factor in all social deviations in the history of mankind.
This linguistic and philosophical determinant does not in any way
exclude or devalue all other long recognized economic, political, reli-
gious, psychological, etc. factors and their undisputable influence on
historical events. It does, however, condition the existence of all other
factors and increases the possibility of learning and understanding
historical events and processes.
The way that the usurpation of control over definitions leads to the
above mentioned “granting of an authoritative ‘moral’ foundation to
an extremely immoral series of events” can be illustrated by applying
it to one example from general and religious history (thus, outside the