The role of Italy in saving the Serbian Army and people, 1915-1916

„In the event of war with Italy, Your Royal Highness will have the task of
maintaining a united force and delivering a decisive blow to the enemy
who will attack. In that regard, Your Royal Highness must gather all
available troops in the zone west of Agram as soon as possible.“ 10
The strategic plan of the Italian Army under the command of
General Luigi Cadorna was an offensive-defensive action to stop Aus-
tria-Hungary at Trenta and the river Adige and concentrate the offen-
sive forces in the east, a bit west of the river Soča. Their goal was to
quickly occupy the city of Gorica and advance via Trieste to Vienna.
The Italians amassed about a half million soldiers on the front and in-
itially had a significant advantage.

4. Diplomatic efforts and failures of the Allies, 1915
Preparing its offensive against Austria, Italy anticipated that Serbia
would continue its movement northward, engage the Austro-Hungarian
forces and delay their transfer to the Italian Front. Therefore, it proposed
to Serbia an offensive in the direction of Ljubljana concurrent with its
own offensive at the river Soča. Serbia accepted the plan but did not im-
plement it and instead directed its forces to the south, to the territory of
Albania which Italy considered its own zone of interest. Serbian occupa-
tion of the Albanian territory continued and Nicola Squitti, the Italian
envoy in Belgrade, reported: „Jovanovic told me today that the Serbian
Army has occupied Elbasan driving out the enemy... He added the fol-
lowing words verbatim: the Serbian government has no intention of oc-
cupying Drač, but it had to expand its military operations on the terri-
tory of Albania [in order] not to leave its borders open to incursions by
various gangs, Austrian and Turkish mercenaries... Pašić confirmed to
me that Serbia had occupied Peshkopi and Pogradec adding that it will
soon also occupy Elbasan but had no intention to come as far as Drač.“ 11
Elbasan did not represent a strategically important position to jus-
tify Serbian occupation and Pašić’s explanation only increased Italy’s
suspicions. Greek armed incidents in Albania, reported by the Italian
consul in Bitolj, generated new worries for Italy given that the progress
and attacks by both the Serbs and the Greeks could induce Bulgaria to
enter the conflict, a move which Italy and the other Allies attempted to
prevent with aggressive diplomacy.
Italian Ambassador Gugleilmo Imperiali intervened from London
telling Minister Sonnino that it would be good to openly inform Serbia
regarding the agreement of the Entente Powers so that Serbia would
know about the territories in Albania and Dalmatia intended for Italy
according to international agreement. 12 Minister Sonnino did not agree
with this and even categorically rejected the proposal: „We will not
inform the Serbian government of the details of the Treaty of London;
we will not recognize territory which Serbia would occupy in Albania
without our consent. I think Italy, France, England and Russia should
simultaneously put pressure on Niš.“ 13
Italy’s position profoundly irritated Serbia so that the government
in Niš decided to intensify Italy’s suspicions that the Serbian Army had
no intention of fulfilling the promise of a joint offensive with the Italian
Army at the river Soča. The situation was further complicated by Am-
bassador Imperiali’s report of some rumours emanating from France
or Russia about a possible agreement to guarantee Croatia, instead of
Macedonia, to Serbia. From Moscow Ambassador Carlotti confirmed
that that was France’s idea to deter Serbia’s territorial claims to Banat
which had been promised to Romania. The assumption that Croatia
would be ceded to Serbia was vehemently opposed by Italy because a
strong Serbian state near the „future Italian Dalmatia“ was not in Italy’s
interest.
On July 29 Minister Sonnino received a new communication and
diplomatic note from the British ambassador in Rome to be presented to
Serbia on behalf of the Allies asking Serbia to seek all possible co-oper-
ation with Bulgaria. 14 The note which England, France, Italy and Russia
delivered to Bulgaria August 4 contained the British proposal of its
foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, that the territory of Serbian Mace-
donia be surrendered to Bulgaria if it enters the war against Turkey by
September 20 „which the Allied Powers were prepared to guarantee im-
mediately.“ 15
The Allies used every conceivable method to urge both Serbia and
Bulgaria to respond, but the replies which they received from both
countries were not what they had expected. On September 6, 1915
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, joined by Turkey, signed a
military agreement in Plyos [Ivanovo Oblast, Russia] stating that they
would attack Serbia within the month.

5. Second Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia
Following its defeat the previous year, the Austro-Hungarian Army
at the Serbian Front was placed under the command of German Field
Marshal August von Mackensen. The invasion of Serbia was ready. The
situation in Serbia was extremely difficult compounded by the inability
of the Allies to send adequate assistance. In an attempt to establish direct
contact with Serbia, on October 5, 1915 English-French troops landed in
Salonika, the port in officially neutral Greece which was dealing with a
constant internal conflict between the pro-German King Constantine I
and the pro-Allied government of Prime Minister Elefterios Venizelos.
On October 6, 1916 Field Marshal Mackensen ordered the attack on
Serbia - the Austro-German troops crossed the Sava River October 6
and attacked Serbia from the north and west utilizing 11 divisions, while
the Bulgarian troops attacked Serbia from the east on October 11.
In response to that action, the government of Italy „on the order
of His Majesty the King, declared war on Bulgaria“ 16 October 19. The
same day Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sonnino insisted before
General Luigi Cadorna, Chief of Staff of the Italian Armed Forces, that
„the question of the participation of our army in the battles in the Bal-
kans initiated by our allies can be in various forms; one of those refers
to a planned expedition through Albania.“ 17 In the meantime, Essad
Pasha Toptani reported to the Italian consul in Drač on the condition of
the roads and communication lines in the event of an Italian landing in
Albania: „Within three weeks the roads out of Drač, Kavaja, Pequini, El-
basan and the route Drač-Tirana-Elbasan will be passable. If the Allies
decide to connect with Serbia through Albania and if the neutrality of
Albania is terminated, Essad Pasha would be prepared to offer the Allies
50,000 men under his command armed with Mauser guns.“ Minister
Sonnino informs Prime Minister Salandra in an October 20 telegram
and warns him that: „it can be expected that a good segment of the
Serbian Army, unable to fend off numerous enemies, will withdraw
to Albania... If they need help, we must give it [to them] as soon as
possible, urgently.“ 18
Surrounded by Austro-German and Bulgarian forces and facing
huge numerical inferiority, the Serbian Army is forced to withdraw
gradually from Prizren across Montenegro and Albania to the sea.
On November 25 it is officially confirmed that the Serbian Army had
entered Albania. This marked the beginning of a magnificent epic of
heroism and determination of a people unprecedented in the history
of mankind.

6. The Serbian Army in Albania, 1915-1916
At a time of great tension, confusion and intense pressure Prime Min-
ister Salandra outlined to the Chief of Staff General Cadorna the need
for the government and military leadership to jointly analyze the cur-
rent situation, especially the repeated requests of Minister Sonnino to
send a smaller military force, already waiting on the shores of Apulia,
to Valona. In that regard, on October 30 as a preventative measure, one
Italian military company occupied the Cape of Sazan which blocked the
entrance to the Valona Harbour. However, General Cadorna vehement-
ly resisted that because the topographic environment of the area around
Valona made it impossible for an effective defense by a small military
force. In response to the negative news from the front in the Vardar
Valley, a meeting was held in Rome November 13 and 14 at which the
views of Minister Sonnino prevailed and about which General Cadorna
wrote: „I had to agree to send considerable forces to Albania with the
precise goal to protect the Serbian Army in its retreat, but I rejected
_________________________
10) Agram is the old name for Zagreb; Ufficio Storico SME, L'esercito italiano
nella Grande Guerra 1915-1916, Roma, 1983, volume II bis, doc.28.
11) Squitti a Sonnino, 690/23 of 8.6.1915, (MAE, DDI, Series V 1914-1918,volume
IV, doc. 125).
12) Imperiali a Sonnino, 703/230, of 7.6.1915, (MAE, DDI, Series V 1914-1918,volume IV, doc. 133).
13) Sonnino a Imperiali, 547, of 8.6.1915. (MAE, DDI, Series V 1914-1918,volume
IV, doc. 269).
14) Sonnino agli Ambasciatori, 762 of 29.7.1915 (MAE, DDI, Series V 1914-1918,volume IV, doc. 492).
15) Ibid, 768 of 31.7. 1915. doc. 505; 769 doc. 506 and lettera Squitti a Sonnino,
1060/65 of 5.8.1915, (MAE, DDI, Series V 1914-1918,volume IV, doc. 531).
16) Sonnino alle ambasciate, 3664, of 19.10.1915, doc. 933.
17) Sonnino a Cadorna, telegram 1260/18 of 19.10.1915, Ibid., doc. 934.
18) Sonnino a Salandra, (MAE, DDI, Serie V 1914-1918, volume IV, doc. 945).