British History on General Mihailovic & Marshall Tito

Cripps begins the description of the year 1942 with “It seemed that
for at least the foreseeable future there would be little resistance to the
axis from either the Chetniks or the Partisans. However, decrypts in
early 1942 revealed that the Partisans were carrying on the fight. “The
truth is that in the regions west of Drina river, to which this quote
refers, the germans were not worried about the Partisans throughout
entire 1941 and the beginning of 1942, they were concerned about the
Chetniks. “Chetnik movement spreads throughout the entire sector
between Sava river and the german/Italian demarcation line”, stated
in the report from november 4th
, by the empowered general from
Zagreb-Von Horstenau.
In December of 1941 the germans issued a bounty for Mihailovic,
offering 200,000 dinars. after german soldiers crossed the Drina ri-
ver, they were provided with Mihailovic’ photos, with promises of add-
itional rewards for his head. In the order for the attack on the insurgents
in eastern Bosnia, the german command in 1941 made the following
list of enemies: Mihailovic’ men, Dangic’ Chetniks, and the commun-
ists. The germans believed that there were more Chetniks than the
Partisans in that region (appr. 20,000 to 6000). In their documents,
Mihailovic was mentioned more often than Major Jezdimir Dangic,
the commander for East Bosnia or Captain Dragoslav racic, who was
the commander of Cer brigade, the strongest unit sent to aid Dangic.
The germans mentioned racic when he was fighting on the east side
of Drina, along with some other Chetnik officers. for example, they
issued search warrants for two tank drivers, Sub-lieutenant Dragomir
Topalovic and Zarko Borisic, who operated tanks confiscated from
germans. on the other hand, german documents do not mention Broz
or his commanders, making Cripps’ conclusion that it was the Parti-
sans and not the Chetniks who continued to fight at the beginning of
1942 rather unusual.

3.
as the year was progressing the germans kept recording confronta-
tions with “Dangic’ Chetniks” and the collaboration between the us-
tashe and the Partisans. according to Cripps’ article, the British code-
breakers also missed these german reports. Here are a few radiograms
of general Paul Bader, commander of Serbia and East Bosnia, to the
commander of the Southeast.
– 20, april 1942: “It seems that an agreement has been reached be-
tween Croatian communists, the ustashe and the advancing parts of
the proletarian brigade from Montenegro, according to which these
groups are not fighting each other.”
– 31, March 1942: “The ustashe, local Partisans and the gangs from
Montenegro are fighting alongside each other against the forces under
Dangic’ command.”
– 10, april 1942: “It appears that the Chetnik group under Dangic’
command is completely defeated in the battles against Croatian army
and the ustashe in collaboration with communists, so that now Dangic
can only achieve local successes.”
The germans recorded the outcome of this collaboration: “Croa-
tian ustashe and Muslim units slaughtered a large number of refugees
who were hurrying towards Drina, throwing some in the river.”
The British were unaware of the communist documentation beca-
use their messages were carried by couriers. “We think that the briga-
des are needed urgently, not to be engaged in the fight against the us-
tashe, but against racic officers and their gendarmes”, wrote the Com-
mander of the Birchanski Partisan unit and Broz’s assistant in March
of 1942. Broz wrote to his commanders of the 1st and 2nd Proletarian
brigades on March 29, that their arrival in eastern Bosnia had “negati-
ve effects, since it took place at the time when the Chetnik units fought
the ustashe beside Han Pijesak.”
Cripps only states the following: “With the onset of spring, the Par-
tisans continued their resistance.” The summer of 1942 he describes in
the following way: “Von Horstenau also reported that by august the
Partisans had seized control of a large area of Croatia, centered on the
town of livno (at its largest, the area they controlled was about the
size of Switzerland), and that the Croats would be unable to retake it.
although not revealed by decrypts, Tito was present and in charge of
the area… reports were received of continued sabotage and clashes
between the Partisans and the axis. on 23 august, general Davidson
wrote that the bulk of resistance activity was being carried out by the
Partisans, but that, in his view, Mihailovic was preserving his forces
"to do their part when a general uprising could be staged”
Cripps does not say that livno is located in Bosnia, or that Hitler
awarded Bosnia to Croatia. It is also unusual that he uncritically uses
the data about the comparison of the Partisan territory to Switzerland.
only by the end of that year, Bihac republic at the reach of its zenith
expanded to 22,500 square kilometers, which is only half the size of
Switzerland. This fact was brought up in the report from December 26,
1942 by general fortner, the commander of the 718th division, the unit
which bordered the Partisans at that time. In the summer of that year
Bihac republic was much smaller.
Contrary to documentation that Cripps was presented with at the
British national archives, general fortner reported that the Partisans
were, in fact, avoiding confrontations with the germans whenever po-
ssible. Instead they concentrated on newly formed Independent State
of Croatia (nDH), but didn’t have any significant confrontations with
them either. according to Cripps, there was only one massive battle
initiated by some resistance movement in the summer of 1942 in foca,
where the Chetniks, after a long struggle, overpowered the axis gar-
rison (Croatian and Muslim). However, this series of german reports
evaded the British code-breakers.
In the orders to his commanders, Broz uses the term “feigned cla-
shes” when referring to arranged battles between Croatians and the
Partisans, where the Croatians would formally fire their weapons and
then allow the Partisans to occupy the abandoned towns. That is why
the statement that the Croatians were not able to recover some of their
territory, is only partially true. fortner’s reports however seem to be
much more reliable. for example, here is the extract from his report
dated october 12, 1942:
“The organization and the arming of various brigades of this Soviet
republic have made awe-inspiring advances. The main suppliers of
weapons are the Croatian armed forces and the ustashe, whose crews
regularly permit disarming without any resistance if attacked with
force. When they flee they leave behind both their heavy equipment
and sometimes even their rifles.” It does not help Cripps’ work that
the British code-breakers, as we have seen, did not intercept german
reports about the collaboration between the Partisans and the ustashe
in the beginning of 1942, neither did the British spies have any clue
about the pre-war collaboration between these groups.
Therefore, we can say that Cripps’ descriptions of the same events
at the end of 1942 seem to be completely out of context as the trans-
cripts of the decoded german messages continued to speak only about
the Partisan resistance. as a result, the British decided to send Colo-
nel William Bailey to assist their officer at Mihailovic’s supreme com-
mand – Bill Hudson, who was expected to give advice on “whom to
support”, along with the information “on the differences between Mi-
hailovic and Tito”. Thus, long before entering the deciding year of 1943,
the British were only formally in dilemma whether to collaborate with
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia or to bring the “thugs” to power.

4.
one of the reasons for such a major change in direction in British
political tactics was defects in tapping the german signals from a
particular region in western Yugoslav provinces. The absence of any
information from the other regions caused even a greater breach. In
fact, the British only deciphered a small portion of german reports
from a single western region, where german division stayed until the
end of 1942 – division number 718. To the east they had divisions 704,
714, and 717. for the first time on the territory of Yugoslav armies, a
new german division was introduced – the elite anti-guerilla regiment
called Brandenburg. This regiment, together with divisions 714 and
717 carried out an operation forstat against Mihailovic’s units in May
and June 1942 on the territory of southwestern Serbia. The operation
was assigned to execute an action #800 aiming to capture Mihailovic.
However the operation failed, and it is unusual that Cripps seems to
be unaware of it, as despite the defect in the British wiretapping ser-
vice, the germans managed to capture a British officer who was at
Mihailovic’s headquarters at that time. amidst the numerous missed
german reports, there is one that stands out in particular. This was
general löhr’s directive sent to general Bader on July 10, 1942. löhr
wrote about “the expansion of Mihailovic’s organization from South
Serbia onto Montenegro and Bosnia, and perhaps to Slovenia and Croa-