British History on General Mihailovic & Marshall Tito

october 10:  from  neronian (14: Berd via  neronian 222): With
Shenton and facefull, 6 greeks, 9 Serbs, attacked the rail line north of
Leskovac. unsuccessful but 3 Bulgarians killed, 3 wounded. one greek
wounded in the legs with hand grenade…”

11.
The main goal of Cripps’ work is to analyze the decrypted german re-
ports. While looking at the reports from this period I came to the con-
clusion that his statements are so incredible that the following phrase
deserves to be repeated again: “There were no reports of any Chetnik
activities.”
It will not be difficult for me to name some of the other characteris-
tic examples. Having spent a lot of time at the Bundes archives I man-
aged to obtain 640 pages of german documents from october 1943
which I used as a reference for my book Serbs against the Wehrmacht
– Unknown German Documents.
I would like to commence with the following report: at 21:50, oc-
tober 4, 1943, the Command of the 15th german mountain corpus in-
forms the 369th division via radio communication about the exact
moment of the planned attack on Visegrad by the Chetniks: “october
5, at 04:00 hours the attack of racic units, from the north along the
right bank of Drina. Suppose they are about 2,000 strong. They are
joined by English general and Major ostojic”.
The following are the german documents from october 5, 1943:
09:35: operative section (369th division) for the commander of 15th
mountain army corpus over the field line: “The attack on Visegrad
from 04:00 hours from north and south.  from 07:00 hours attack
escalated. northeastern part of Visegrad is taken by the Chetniks.
Help from air.”
09:40: 3rd battalion of the 370th grenadines regiment reporting over
the radio: “04:00 hours strong attack with heavy weapons. attack grew
stronger from 07:00 hours. northeastern Visegrad taken by Chetniks.
Beg for reinforcements from rogatica. Plead for air help.”
10:00: Supreme Croatian Command announcing: “2nd mountain
brigade reports: Visegrad surrounded. northeastern part of the city is
taken by the enemy. 6th mountain regiment demands air surveillance.
The militia has fled, locals followed them. Manpower engaged in fight-
ing needs reinforcements.”
10:05: 3rd battalion of the 370th grenadier regiment announcing over
the radio: “Pressure from the east so strong the home security and gen-
darmes fled. Please, send immediate air force.”
10:45: operative section to the15th mountain army corpus by tele-
communication: “operative section demands urgent decision whether
to abandon Visegrad and the bridge on lim. The message to the army
about this decision is still on the way. We advise the decision be brought
right away, there is a possibility the battalion might be destroyed. Send
urgent help because the division has no available forces…”
12:35: general in Command to the division Command by telecom-
munication: “The general is of the opinion that the bridge was aban-
doned without a fight. order for the 3rd battalion of the 370th regiment
is to retake the bridge. The division command warns that the bridge
was located in the valley and that the hills around it were occupied by
the strong Chetnik forces, the battalion is not able to execute the order.
The general insists on it and says that if that the order is not completed,
he will he will keep that in mind …The general orders an attack on
lim Bridge…”
The order of the commander of the 15th mountain army corpus was
not executed. With great losses of the axis, Visegrad was freed, and
lim Bridge was destroyed. That was the biggest bridge brought down
since the april War on the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The
detonators were activated by an elite corpus of British Major archie
Jack. all of the battles were monitored by the British general Charles
armstrong and Colonel Bailey, as well as by the american Colonel
albert Seitz. The reports were sent on a daily basis.
However, the allied officers did not accompany the Chetniks as
they continued their advancements towards Sarajevo. We only have
german documents to support this statement and yet here are some of
the excerpts from those documents: the telegram of the operative sec-
tion of the 369th division to the 15th corpus, sent on october 8, 1943, at
12 hours and 15 minutes: “overtaking rogatica, the next Chetnik task”,
“Division suggests: bringing forth of the regiment in order to hold the
line Sokolac-rogatica-Mesici-gorazde, to prevent further penetration
to the west and advancement towards the lim bridge”. Same day, at 14
hours and 20 minutes, main command for Croatia announced to the
Command of the 369th division: “The situation between rogatica and
Visegrad worsened due to the arrival of strong forces to this region.”
operative section of the 379th division october 10, at 12:15 infor-
ming the command of the 15th mountain corpus about further develop-
ments of the events: “Strong Chetnik groups slowly penetrating from
Visegrad and lim bridge, towards Jabuka-Sedlo-rogatica. Most units
at Strmac-Kopijevici – railway station Dub are exposed. rogatica is
under a threat.”
at 18 hours and 30 minutes the 3rd Croatian corpus informed the
369th division that the Croatian air force bombarded five Chetnik loca-
tions in the region. nonetheless, due to the fact that the Chetniks were
bombarded any clear day, they attacked when it was overcast.
17:20: october 13, operative section of the 369th division informs
the Command of the 15th mountain corpus: “a rather strong Chetnik
attack with mine throwers and 105 mm guns on the Jabucko saddle
Mesici and rogatica. rogatica attacked from all sides. The division is
retreating towards the line Pale, Mokro, Sokolac.”
9:15: october 14, 3rd battalion has reported about the retreat of do-
mobrans (home security): “The domobrans received an order to march
toward Pale. Croatian battalions cannot hold their positions”, reported
the 3rd battalion, to which the command of the 369th division ordered:
“It is necessary that the resistance be intensified. as the last resort shoot
the retreating Croatians.”
That same day at 13:20 a final decision was made concerning the
retreat, by the 3rd Croatian corpus; “Due to a strong Chetnik pressure
on rogatica, a withdrawal has been ordered of the rogatica manpower
to the line Sokolac-Mokro-Pale”.
This was the last attempt to defend Sarajevo.
on october 10, at 12:15, the operative section of the 369th division
for the first time alerts the Command of the 15th corpus about a possi-
ble Chetnik rebellion erupting within Sarajevo itself: “arrival of new
troops is urgently required for the area east of Sarajevo. retreat of bat-
talion B of the separate regiment 1 and of certain units from Sarajevo
is impossible, for at any given moment a rebellion can break out in the
region.”
operative section of the 369th division in the report from october
14, at 18:40 for the first time describes the full circle of the Chetnik
entrapment of Sarajevo: “Very strong forces of Chetnik bandits in the
direction of Kula-Praca east of Sarajevo, but after the merging of the
1st Bosnian Chetnik corpus north, south and west of Sarajevo (Visoko),
the Chetniks captured the city …92nd regiment and the SS battalion
have not arrived yet… request for precise orders for the 92nd regiment
and accelerated shipment of troops to Sarajevo in order to repel the
Chetniks.”
german documents from october 21, 1943 recorded greatest Chet-
nik activity not only in the region of Sarajevo, but on the suburbs too.
“at 05:20 Chetnik assault on the Stambolichi was repelled with the help
of the armored train”, states the first one from the series of reports.
“The Chetniks capture the high point 1037 in the Vitez region. a detac-
hment of germans has broken through out of galesh toward north-
east, but was attacked on all sides at the hill 914. Succeeded in getting
through to Vitez.”
“according to the reports of scattered domobrans, there were
2-3000 Chetniks at Sjetlina”, recorded in the diary of the 369th division.
“On october 21, the base Pracko Vrelo was attacked and set ablaze, in
addition there were mortar bombs and machine guns were heard”,
stated in the report of the 1st huntsmen regiment. “Podbukovica occu-
pied by 3-400 Chetniks”, reported the 3rd Croatian corpus. There were
still some parts of the 1st ustashe brigade stationed at Podbukovica.
at 19:00 hours 100 Chetniks attacked parts of the 1st ustashe brigade at
Pohovac. Chetnik artillery was attacking the remaining positions of
the 1st ustashe brigade at Sokolac from south-southeast. around 22:00
Chetniks attacked railroad stations Ilijash, Vogosca and Semizovac
northwest of Sarajevo.

12.
When we pay closer attention to the British documents about the Par-
tisan battles, we can’t help but notice that as a general rule they only
talk about defensive battles and retreats from the germans. There is
no mentioning of any cities or villages that Partisans captured from
germans. neither are they mentioned in german reports.  I guess they
never happened. Conversely, the British and Chetnik’s documents