British History on General Mihailovic & Marshall Tito

seeing the way the wind was blowing, sought to collaborate with the
germans. Intercepted reports from Dr Baux detailed the negotiations
that he was having with the Chetnik leader in Herzegovina, Jevdjevic,
who was offering to deploy 5,000-6,000 Chetniks in co-operation with
the germans against the Partisans.”
The truth is that at that time Vojvoda Jevdjevic was in rome and
stayed captive in Italy from June 1943 up until its capitulation…
It is interesting how Cripps fails to realize that two of his following
sentences correspond to each other. “In the meantime, a message from
Dimitrov to Tito in early July advised the Partisan leader to conserve
his forces for future decisive fighting – a clear indication of the level
of control exercised over him by Moscow. “and “a Sicherheitsdienst
report confirmed what the British also thought from their intelligence,
that Mihailovic would only act if and when the allies invaded the
Balkans.” Both of these statements come to the same conclusion, that
conflicting parties are saving their energy for the future confrontation.
Yet, someone backed away. according to Cripps, it is understood that it
was the Partisans. He omits the mentioning of the fact that the Chet-
niks also fought together with the Italians against the germans in the
region of Dubrovnik. Moreover, they succeeded in forming a bridge-
head over the adriatic, hoping for the landing of Western allies. Cripps
writes: “But decrypts also revealed that the germans had largely dealt
with the Italian problem by mid-october, when a report revealed that
over 10,000 Italian officers and a quarter of a million men were being
removed from Yugoslavia. There were no reports of Chetnik activity.
The British knew from their liaison officers that Mihailovic had told
his men not to carry out sabotage or engage the germans.” “Maclean
arrived to join Deakin on September 18, 1943… By the end of Septem-
ber Talbot rice prepared a detailed assessment. He confirmed that
there had been only isolated anti-german activity by Mihailovic, but
that ‘the heroes of the hour are undoubtedly the Partisans’, who had
seized large stretches of the coast He advised that the Partisans were
successfully embarrassing the germans and that their “military ef-
forts deserve all the support we can give them”… “Churchill was still
very much interested in what was happening in Yugoslavia”. one of
the transcripts from the german commander for the southeast related
to the “forceful and strong resistance from communist bandits”…
Cripps continues: “at the end of october, Churchill was sent a
further assessment by MI3b, advising him in detail on the situation
and concluding that ‘the The Partisans had been able to take over the
initiative over practically all of Yugoslavia’. Mihailovic was not men-
tioned except for the fact that in Montenegro some of his supporters
had deserted to the Partisans as ‘the more active body’.”
an uninformed reader might conclude that the Partisans fought
bloody battles for Split. Perhaps, he might even be puzzled by those
suggestions considering the fact that the Italians have already surren-
dered their weapons. The truth is that the Italians capitulated and the
Partisans were able to enter Split without firing a single weapon. The
question is why did the Italians surrender their weapons and ammu-
nition? for a very simple reason:  while they were expounding their
conditions of capitulation, they followed the orders from the Britain.
and what is the exact meaning behind these euphemisms “great
quantities of weapons” and “many Italians joining the Partisans”? In
the german documents there is no mentioning of these events taking
place. on the contrary, the germans reported that they successfully
disarmed the Italians, as can be concluded from the number of officers
and soldiers “removed” from Yugoslavia.
The heart of the matter eluded Cripps one more time. The plan was
not to remove the Italians – those were german intentions – but to re-
main and to engage in battle against Hitler. The Italians themselves
suggested this to the British command, naming general Mihailovic as
their new comrade. In that moment, it looked as if Mihailovic’s game
with legalized Chetniks had all chances to become effective. Com-
bined together, the Italians and Chetniks formed a substantial oppos-
ition of 400,000 people, outnumbering the germans significantly. The
Balkans could have been liberated by the end of 1943, with a nothing
more than a symbolic joining of allied forces.
However, the Italians had no intentions to be placed under the
command of the communists, and that is why they boycotted the Brit-
ish orders.

10.
The following Cripps’ words are iconic and they ought to be repeated:
“There were no reports of Chetnik activity. The British knew from their
liaison officers that Mihailovic had told his men not to carry out sabo-
tage or engage the germans…”
first of all, these communication officers reported quite the oppos-
ite: “September 12-13th: Having received the news about the surrender
of general Badoglio (following allied invasion of Italy on September
3rd, 1943), general Mihailovic ordered all of his commanders to attack
the german and the Italian occupational forces, believing that the in-
vasion was next to come. This witness has personally read many of tho-
se orders before they were dispatched over the radio.”
The witness was Colonel Bailey himself, a figure who was very in-
disposed towards Mihailovic.
Secondly, in this period, the British officers, of whom more than
50 were in the Chetniks’ units, sent hundreds of reports about Chetnik
battles against the axis formations. Colonel Bailey said that during the
liberation of Prijepolje from the germans on September 12, the Chet-
niks killed “more than 200 germans”. on the same day, the British
informed their command in Cairo that a detachment of the Chetniks
has overpowered parts of the 118th division, which were attempting to
disarm the Italians at Priboj. The information regarding the battles for
Zvornik was communicated to Cairo by the British military mission
in the following message:
“from rapir (174): September 17. Mihailovic forces were recaptured
from Huns (code name for germans) in Zvornik and repelled all coun-
ter attacks. robyn”.
The British military mission reported to Cairo on September 29:
“Completed destruction of four bridges in 15 hours, near Mokra gora.
Bridge #1 three separate arches, one triple arched, all coated with steel.
Two attempts to derail the train in the tunnel failed, the train jumped
gaps.”
later on, on october 3rd, British mission reports that the germans
have rounded up 200 hostages in uzice. By october 5th
British officers
sent a telegram to their command about a new Chetnik action, where
they say that the railroad near Dobrun is “destroyed in many places”
and that “for now the germans have given up using it between uzice
and Sarajevo.”
Here are ten British reports taken at random:
“September 23: from rapir (point 20) on the 23rd of Sept. Mihailo-
vic destroys a train full of Huns and explosives in the tunnel 20 km
east of Pec. The train derailed in the tunnel noe (?) Mills (?)
September 26-27: from angelique (89): Station master at Mitro-
vica reporting the following sabotages. a. Collision of Vucitrn trains
19:45 hours 26, Sept. # 4876. (?) Eight wagons destroyed, including two
with fuel that exploded. 29 Huns hospitalized in Mitrovica. B. a single
wagon jumped tracks Zvecan 27th Sept. C. 2 km of tracks destroyed 30
kilometers north of raska, the line nP (?) (out of use?) 48 hours.
october 1: from angelique (95): the following was prepared by the
Mitrovica station master 4:30 hours, 1st october Vucitrn. Collision
between train 5874 carrying coal for Salunar (?), and train 4851 carry-
ing prisoners to Belgrade. Both locomotives, seven wagons, totally de-
stroyed, the line interrupted 14 hours. field.
from Enamel (84): october 14 the Chetniks executed a successful
unexpected attack on germans between Planinac (Planinica close to
Boljevac) and leskov (leskovac beside Zajecar) approx. 15 kilometers
south and southwest of Zajecar. later germans received Bulgarian re-
inforcements from Zajecar and the Chetniks retreated; german cas-
ualties 20, a Bulgarian lieutenant died later in the hospital. Believe to
be true, investigated witnesses.
october 5: from rapir (174): forces under Djuri destroyed t. (train)
full of trp. (troops) and explosives in the tunnel 20 km east of Pec.
october 6: from Cavern 2 (97): The track (blown up) … 2500 me-
ters near station Polumir in the Ibar valley near raska.
october 6: from Cavern 2 (97): railroad (blown up) between Les-
kovac and Vranje.
october 7: 32 rafshod 58 (Yours 58 from 4): (1) fjug right now des-
troyed one kilometer of railroad. out of use for probably 10 days.
Expect reprisals and ask for 5 packages right away and 5 later in the
month. Delegated a task to the local commander…
october 8: from angelique (96): a train derailed on the line Pris-
tina-Pec, 400 laborers worked for 15 days before it was operative. The
Huns did not release the number of killed and wounded Huns. field.