British History on General Mihailovic & Marshall Tito

tia, north of the river Sava”. noting that even in Serbia “there is news
about destructive organizational activity on the part of Mihailovic”
löhr concluded: “Mihailovic is the most dangerous opponent”.
This directive has a further significance despite the erroneous Brit-
ish conclusions due to a series of tapping defects. The most significant
fact is that the germans managed to detect Mihailovic’s organization
even from across the river Drina. It sounds absurd, but it is a fact even
though the British have always denied it. Ever since they first heard of
Mihailovic, they tried to limit him to the region west of Drina. Inter-
estingly enough, these are the exact borders (river Drina) that the com-
munists tried to re-establish during the unification in 1918. In fact, they
tried to erase three western Serbian provinces – Vrbas, Drina, and Zeta.
This is an interesting topic, similar to that of a striking resemblance
of Camp X to the gars. Here we need to shift our focus to the unbeliev-
able examples of numerous flaws of the British wiretapping service
starting from summer of 1942. among the top ten there is undoubted-
ly the order from one of the most important men in the Hitler’s circle,
Heinrich Himmler, sent to “gestapo – Miller” on July 17, 1942: “The
basis of all success in Serbia and all of southeastern Europe lies in the
destruction of Mihailovic. use all available forces to locate him and his
headquarters in order to destroy him. anything that helps to achieve
this goal is appropriate. I expect closest collaboration of all institu-
tions concerned, from the Security Police to SS to the police itself. The
head of SS and the police (in the occupied Serbia) Meisner already has
my orders. let me know what kind of information we already possess
regarding Mihailovic’s whereabouts. Have weekly reports sent to me
informing about the progress of this action”.
It is relevant to mention that every time these weekly reports were
wired, Bletchley Park employees were either busy having “5 o’clock tea”
or occupied with other things. How else would they miss each and
every one of those dispatches? They neglected the report from the two-
day counseling of german commands in Belgrade in august 28 and 29,
1942, led by löhr personally, where the main topic of discussion was
Mihailovic’s organization and its annihilation. In the same manner
the British failed to notice smaller operations, such as dispatching of
division 714 in pursuit of the Chetniks on ravna gora. However, the
most phenomenal fact is that the British failed to register the second
visit of the highest ranked german officer to the occupied Yugoslavia.
Heinrich Himmler visited Kraljevo on 15-18 october 1942 (the first vi-
sit was Hitler’s short escapade to Maribor). It appears that entire bureau
at Bletchley Park was on a holiday not only between october 15-18, but
at least a week before and after. That is how the British were short-han-
ded about the information concerning the introduction of an extra di-
vision into the battlefield east of the Bihac republic: the 7th mountain
SS division Prince Eugen. Himmler himself went there and was pre-
sent during the operation under a code name operation Kopaonik,
executed against the rasina corpus, Mihailovic’s strongest forces in
this region. It is important to point out that this was one of over thirty
German operations directed against Mihailovic’s forces between 1941
and 1945. Since all of them were described in the reports from the
German units and commands, is it even necessary to ask how many
of these operations were registered by the British? The answer is evi-
dent – none!

5.
a certain politician once said that small countries commit small fol-
lies; great countries commit greater ones… Perhaps he had great Brit-
ain in mind, as it is the only country that has the word “great” in its
title and yet, follies tend to multiply in it. Is that why at some point the
British failed to discern who was fighting against whom? They knew,
until proven contrary thanks to some of Cripps’ new work, that during
World War I they were allied with the Serbs against the germans, Cro-
atians, Muslims and albanians who fought under the german com-
mand. They also knew that the putsch against the Tri-Pact with ger-
mans on March 27, 1941, was carried out by the Serbs. In any case, they
encouraged and coerced the Serbs to perform such an act. They very
well knew that any money spent on the Croatian Peasant Party would be
wasted and therefore they chose to finance the Serbian national defense.
However, as soon as the war broke out, the British were overtaken
by an unusual “blackout”. first of all they failed to decipher Hitler’s
order to attack the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, known as ‘Plan 25’. Hitler
emphasized that his only enemies in Yugoslavia are the Serbs, and that
the german army comes as a friend and a liberator to all other people.
later, the British failed to notice that the germans were welcome to
Croatia and greeted with flowers. They did not register that the ger-
mans were executing Serbs while recruiting Croatians, Muslims and
albanians for their SS troops and legions. Throughout the war the Brit-
ish code-breakers failed to intercept german radio messages where
the Serbs were labeled as enemies. That was yet another catastrophic
oversight, for whenever the germans named an enemy in Yugoslavia,
they always meant the Serbs; Croatians, Muslims and albanians were
always regarded as allies. Whenever they executed, and they did it
abundantly and frequently, they mentioned only one nation – Serbian
(of course, they always mentioned the Jews as well, but since our topic
for today is Yugoslavia, we speak of the Serbs). Whenever they threat-
ened, they always threatened the Serbs: “Serbs! You have already ex-
perienced the might, the speed and the severity of the german mil-
itary power… a necessary and unavoidable punishment has befallen
on the villages of Kopaonik. let that be your last warning.” These were
the words of general arthur Phleps, commander of the SS division
Prince Eugen, elaborating on the beastly murders of hundreds of Serb-
ian civilians during the operation Kopaonik.
The British code-breakers not only failed to intercept every single
german report concerning the reprisals against the Serbs, they also
refused to believe Serbian testimonies about the magnitude of the su-
ffering inflicted upon them. The president of the Yugoslav government-
in-exile, Slobodan Jovanovic, informed the British government about
german atrocities in Kopaonik. unfortunately, Cripps did not see
that letter, nor did he see the note on the margins left by the function-
ary of the foreign office, orm Sargent: “Do not believe a word of it!”
Who did the British believe then? Just as Hitler’s germans and Stalin’s
Soviets, they believed the Croatians. They welcomed the news that a
Croat, Tito, was the leader of the ‘thugs’ in Yugoslavia. from then on
Churchill used the terms ‘Croat Tito’ and ‘Mihailovic the Serb’, ‘Cro-
atian Partisans’ and ‘Serbian Chetniks’. right away he started search-
ing for another Croat, whom he could utilize outside of Yugoslavia. He
found one in the person of Ivan Subasic, head of the Croatian Prov-
ince in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. afterwards, he expelled the Serbs
from the government in exile based in london, and established the
Temporary Yugoslav government led by Subasic, who also became the
Minister. Having accomplished that, Churchill “expressed his hope”
that these two Croats will successfully solve the “question of the Serb-
ian King”, meaning the King of Yugoslavia Peter II, whom he had the
privilege of welcoming in london earlier. and they truly solved this
question. The icing on the cake came a half century later, when Mar-
garet Thatcher arrived in Zagreb and spoke about the collaboration of
the British and the Croatians against the germans during World War
II. We can only imagine how the Croatians laughed behind her back,
as they sang the newly composed quasi-anthem ‘Danke Deutschland’,
together with pro-ustashe hit songs by Mark Pekovich Thompson.

6.
In the second half of 1942 and in the beginning of 1943, Britain paid par-
ticularly close attention to Yugoslavia, as their army waged the decid-
ing battles in africa against Hitler’s best Commander, Marshal Erwin
romel. History has recorded these battles under the name “Battles for
Supplies”. african sand was barren and hence the victory belonged to
the best supplied army. The shortest route of german supplies went
through Yugoslavia, more precisely through Serbia. as a result, Brit-
ain appealed to the Yugoslav government for help by approaching
not the ‘thugs’, but the communists. The answer was positive and the
Yugoslav army (the Chetniks) initiated a series of sabotages and diver-
sions along the railroads. This was the moment in time that made the
germans change their priorities. löhr’s report to the Supreme Com-
mand of Wehrmacht for november 29, 1942 stated the following: “for
Croatia, as well as for Serbia, the main task remains constant security
of transported supplies towards greece”. Here is where löhr saw the
greatest threat: “guard posts are being erected for the protection of
railroads and other important buildings:
on the Serbian territory: 177 completed, 58 in construction, 6 prepared.
on the Croatian territory: 29 completed, 67 in construction, 34 prepared”.
under Serbian territory löhr meant nedic’ Serbia and under Cro-
atian territory he understood ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (nDH),
which was at least three times the size of the former. Both the Partisans